U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C.
Litigation Release No. 18038 / March 17, 2003
 

Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1742 / March 17, 2003
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Daniel H. Bayly, Thomas W. Davis, Robert S. Furst, Schuyler M. Tilney, Case No. H-03-0946 (Hoyt) (S.D. Tx)

SEC Charges Merrill Lynch, Four Merrill Lynch Executives with Aiding and Abetting Enron Accounting Fraud

     Merrill Lynch Simultaneously Settles Charges for Permanent Anti-Fraud Injunction and Payment of $80 Million in Disgorgement, Penalties and Interest
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. and four of its former senior executives with aiding and abetting Enron Corp.'s securities fraud. The Commission's complaint, filed in U.S. District Court in Houston, alleges that Merrill Lynch and its former executives aided and abetted Enron Corp.'s earnings manipulation by engaging in two fraudulent year-end transactions in 1999. The transactions had the purpose and effect of overstating Enron's reported financial results. Specifically, Enron used these transactions to add approximately $60 million to its fourth quarter of 1999 income (improving net income from $199 million to $259 million or 33 percent) and to increase its full year 1999 earnings per share from $1.09 to $1.17.

    Simultaneous with the filing of this action, the Commission has agreed to accept Merrill Lynch's offer to settle this matter. Merrill Lynch, without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, has agreed to pay $80 million dollars in disgorgement, penalties and interest and has agreed to the entry of a permanent anti-fraud injunction prohibiting future violations of the federal securities laws. The Commission intends to have these funds paid into a court account pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for ultimate distribution to victims of the fraud. The four former Merrill Lynch executives named in the complaint, Robert S. Furst, Schuyler M. Tilney, Daniel H. Bayly, and Thomas W. Davis, are contesting the matter.

    The Commission's complaint alleges that, in late December 1999, senior Enron executives approached Merrill Lynch with the two transactions it had designed. As alleged, the first transaction was an asset-parking arrangement whereby on December 29, 1999, Merrill Lynch bought an interest in certain Nigerian barges from Enron with an express understanding that Enron would arrange for the sale of this interest by Merrill Lynch within six months at a specified rate of return. In substance, this transaction was, at best, a bridge loan because the risks and rewards of ownership of the interest in the barges did not pass to Merrill Lynch.

    As further alleged in the complaint, Merrill Lynch and the named executives knew that Enron would record $28 million in revenue and $12 million in pre-tax income in connection with this transaction. The Commission alleges that Merrill Lynch and the named executives entered into this transaction solely to accommodate Enron, despite express concerns that Merrill Lynch could appear to be aiding and abetting Enron's earnings manipulation. In 2000, Enron arranged to take Merrill Lynch out of the barge deal on the agreed time frame at the agreed rate of return.

    In the second transaction, also closed in the last days of December 1999, Merrill Lynch and Enron entered into two energy options — one physical and one financial — that Merrill Lynch knew had the purpose and effect of inflating Enron's income by approximately $50 million. The complaint details that, at year-end 1999, the trading under these options was not scheduled to begin for approximately nine months. Before the transaction was closed, the complaint alleges, Enron told Merrill Lynch that, despite a nominal term of four years, it might want to unwind this transaction early.

    Merrill Lynch believed that the two trades were essentially a wash and knew that the transaction would have a significant impact on Enron's reported results, bonuses, and stock price. Merrill Lynch demanded a multi-million dollar fee for entering into this transaction; Enron ultimately agreed to pay Merrill Lynch a structured fee to be paid over four years with a net present value of $17 million. In 2000, Enron approached Merrill Lynch seeking to unwind the transaction before trading under the energy options was scheduled to begin. The deal was unwound in June 2000 after Merrill Lynch agreed to reduce its fee to $8.5 million to terminate the transaction.

    The complaint alleges that Merrill Lynch and the named executives aided and abetted Enron's violations of the anti-fraud, reporting, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the federal securities laws. For these violations, the Commission seeks in its complaint a permanent injunction, disgorgement, and civil penalties with respect to Merrill Lynch and, with respect to the individual defendants, permanent injunctions, civil penalties, and permanent officer and director bars.

    Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Merrill Lynch agreed to file a consent and final judgment settling the Commission's action against it. In the consent, Merrill Lynch has agreed, without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint, to the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining it from future violations of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2), and 13(b)(5) and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, and 13b2-1 thereunder.

    Merrill Lynch also has agreed to pay disgorgement, penalties and interest in the amount of $80 million. Specifically, Merrill Lynch will pay $37.5 million in disgorgement, $5 million in prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty of $37.5 million. As noted above, the Commission intends to have these funds paid into a court account pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for ultimate distribution to victims of the fraud.

    In agreeing to resolve this matter on the terms described above, the Commission took into account certain affirmative conduct by Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch terminated Messrs. Davis and Tilney after they refused to testify before the staff and instead asserted their Fifth Amendment rights. In addition, Merrill Lynch brought the energy trade transaction to the staff's attention at a time when it believed the staff was unaware of its existence.

    The Commission acknowledges the assistance provided by the staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in this investigation.

    The Commission also acknowledges the continuing coordination among the Division of Enforcement, the Justice Department Enron Task Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Enron investigation.

    The Commission's investigation is continuing. For additional information see.